D
Dan Goodin
Sometime around 2010, sophisticated malware known as Flame hijacked the mechanism that Microsoft used to distribute updates to millions of Windows computers around the world. The malware—reportedly jointly developed by the US and Israel—pushed a malicious update throughout an infected network belonging to the Iranian government.
The lynchpin of the "collision" attack was an exploit of MD5, a cryptographic hash function Microsoft was using to authenticate digital certificates. By minting a cryptographically perfect digital signature based on MD5, the attackers forged a certificate that authenticated their malicious update server. Had the attack been used more broadly, it would have had catastrophic consequences worldwide.
The event, which in 2012, now serves as a cautionary tale for cryptography engineers as they contemplate the downfall of two crucial cryptography algorithms used everywhere. Since , MD5 has been known to be vulnerable to "collisions," a fatal flaw that allows adversaries to generate two distinct inputs that produce identical outputs.
The lynchpin of the "collision" attack was an exploit of MD5, a cryptographic hash function Microsoft was using to authenticate digital certificates. By minting a cryptographically perfect digital signature based on MD5, the attackers forged a certificate that authenticated their malicious update server. Had the attack been used more broadly, it would have had catastrophic consequences worldwide.
Getting uncomfortably close to the danger zone
The event, which in 2012, now serves as a cautionary tale for cryptography engineers as they contemplate the downfall of two crucial cryptography algorithms used everywhere. Since , MD5 has been known to be vulnerable to "collisions," a fatal flaw that allows adversaries to generate two distinct inputs that produce identical outputs.
